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Moderate Upswing in Euroland 
  by  Klaus-Jürgen Gern, Christophe Kamps, Carsten-Patrick Meier, 
  and Joachim Scheide
CONTENTS 
   Economic activity in the euro area is recovering. 
In the second half of 2003, real GDP grew at an 
annualized rate of roughly 1½ percent. In con-
trast with other large industrialized countries, 
economy-wide capacity utilization has not yet 
increased. Private consumption has remained 
the major weak point. However, private invest-
ment has increased for the first time since 2½ 
years and exports have risen rapidly, stimulated 
by the strong upswing in the rest of the world. A 
number of leading indicators suggest that the 
recovery in Euroland has gained some momen-
tum since the turn of the year. 
   Despite an expansionary monetary policy and 
the dynamic world economy, real GDP in the 
euro area will rise only moderately in compari-
son with earlier upswings. This is due to two fac-
tors. First, potential output growth in the euro 
area has apparently decelerated. Second, fiscal 
policy especially in the large euro-area econo-
mies is not sustainable. As governments do not 
have a credible consolidation strategy, the tax 
burden is likely to increase in the coming years. 
Against this background private households’ in-
come prospects are subdued and, as a conse-
quence, private consumption will remain com-
paratively weak.  
   The appreciation of the euro has had a con-
siderable effect on economic activity, but it will 
not stop recovery. The results of our macro-
econometric model imply also that the effects 
will be small in 2005 if, as we assume, the euro/ 
dollar exchange rate remains unchanged. 
 
   Some observers urge the ECB to react to the 
strength of the euro by cutting interest rates. 
Whether the ECB should do so depends solely 
on the way in which the appreciation of the euro 
impacts the targets embedded in its monetary 
policy strategy. The main issue is whether the 
appreciation of the euro will push the inflation 
rate considerably below the target value. Past 
experience suggests that it would be unwise to 
assume it will have a strong dampening effect 
on consumer prices. Since the beginning of 
monetary union inflation forecasts have usually 
been too optimistic. All in all, the ECB is well 
advised not to cut interest rates in response to 
recent exchange rate developments. Interest 
rates in the euro area are already unusually low 
and stimulate economic activity.  
   The Stability and Growth Pact requires the gov-
ernments in euro-area countries to achieve a 
balanced budget or a budget surplus in the 
medium run. The main problem at present is not 
that budget deficit to GDP ratios are higher than 
3 percent in some countries, but that structural 
deficits are also very high. Seven years after the 
adoption of the Pact the large countries still 
have made no progress on the way to a bal-
anced budget. In Germany and France the 
structural deficits are even higher than before 
the monetary union. The recent Stability Pro-
grams of these countries suggest that the bal-
anced-budget target has been given up alto-
gether. This is eroding the credibility of fiscal 
policy and constitutes a heavy blow to economic 
stability in the euro area. Unsound fiscal policy 
negatively affects expectations in the private 
sector and is likely to result in a further decel-
eration of potential output growth. 
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Moderate Upswing in Euroland 
In the spring of 2004, the euro-area economy is 
on the road of recovery. While the previous stag-
nation has been overcome, one cannot speak of a 
true upswing. In fact, real GDP rose by a little 
less than 1½ percent in the second half of last 
year. Capacity utilization has not yet increased 
which is in contrast to the recent development of 
other major industrial countries. The weak spot 
has been private consumption which has only 
stagnated so far. However, fixed investment went 
up for the first time in 2½ years. A strong sup-
port for the upturn came from abroad. Since pro-
duction in the rest of the world has risen sharply, 
exports have shown a strong performance al-
though the euro appreciation has had a negative 
impact. 
There are several reasons why we forecast an 
acceleration of economic activity this year. Low 
interest rates are stimulating domestic demand; 
we expect that the European Central Bank (ECB) 
will not change its key rates soon. In addition, the 
impulses from abroad will remain strong. Several 
leading indicators are favorable. The business cli-
mate has continued to improve, and new orders 
as well as production plans have moved upwards. 
While the conditions for investment brighten up, 
consumer confidence remains subdued. 
In spite of the expansionary course of mone-
tary policy and the strong expansion of world de-
mand, the increase of Euroland’s real GDP will 
remain moderate in 2004 and 2005 when com-
pared to previous recovery periods. First, poten-
tial output growth has apparently slowed down in 
recent years. One indication is the fact that real 
GDP increased only very little in the past few 
years. Second, fiscal policy especially in major 
economies is not sustainable. As there is no 
credible strategy for budget consolidation in the 
coming years, budget deficits will remain high 
and problems of social security will aggravate 
further. This implies the risk of higher taxes and 
social contributions as well as considerable cuts 
in social transfers. Income expectations of con-
sumers are therefore depressed so that spending 
of private households will rise only modestly in 
the coming years. 
Apart from these factors, which will have a 
negative impact on growth in the medium term, 
the short-run outlook is dampened by the appre-
ciation of the euro. According to our estimates 
there is a significant effect on real GDP but it 
will not be so large as to jeopardize the recovery 
per se. In addition, the effects will fade substan-
tially so that GDP growth next year is hardly af-
fected at all given our assumption that the euro 
exchange rate will roughly remain unchanged 
against the U.S. dollar. 
1  Hesitant Economic Recovery 
Economic activity in the euro area picked up 
somewhat in the second half of 2003. Real GDP 
increased at an annualized rate of 1.4 percent, 
after having decreased slightly in the first half of 
last year (Figure 1). Notwithstanding, the in-
crease in economy-wide production continued to 
be lower than trend growth.1 The current weak-
ness has prevailed for three years now which is 
long also in historical comparison. Only in the 
recession years 1980–1982 the euro area ex-
perienced a cyclical downturn of similar length. 
However, measured against the change in econ-
omy-wide capacity utilization, the downturn at 
that time had been much stronger than the cur-
rent one.2 This may be an explanation for the ob-
servation that  the labor market  has only slightly  
____________________ 
1The OECD (2003) estimates potential output growth in the 
euro area at 2 percent. In our view, however, there are signs 
that it is perceptibly lower. 
2The change in the output gap between cyclical peak and 
trough is a common measure for the strength of a downturn. 
As concerns the recession at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
business cycle reached its peak in 1979 and its trough in 
1982. During this period the output gap fell by 5 percentage 
points according to OECD (2003) estimates. The recession 
at the beginning of the 1990s reached a comparable order of 
magnitude. In contrast, the output gap fell only by around 3 
percentage points between 2000, the year in which the 
current cycle reached its peak, and 2003. The statement on 
the relative mildness of the current downturn remains valid 
if other methods than that of the OECD are used in the 
calculation of the output gap (Gern et al. 2003: 12–13; 
Carstensen et al. 2003: 5). 4 
Figure 1: 
Business Cycle Indicatorsa for Euroland, 2001–2004 
 














































































































































































































































aSeasonally adjusted. — bAt constant prices. — cPercentage change over previous quarter (annual rate). — dIndustry 
excluding construction. — ePercentage change over previous year. 
Source: EUROFRAME (2004); Eurostat (2004); ECB (2004). 5 
deteriorated over the past years. In the fourth 
quarter of 2003, the unemployment rate stood at 
8.8 percent and was only 0.8 percentage points 
higher than at its cyclical low in the first half of 
2001. In the course of last year, the unemploy-
ment rate remained roughly constant despite the 
continued economic weakness. In the meantime, 
the number of employees in the total economy 
stagnated; while employment in the industrial 
sector sharply contracted, employment in the 
service sector expanded. 
The recovery of economic activity in the 
second half of 2003 was mainly due to the turn-
around of exports. While exports had fallen 
sharply in the first half of the year, they in-
creased at an annualized rate of around 5 percent 
in the second half. It has to be kept in mind, 
though, that the trade data published by Eurostat 
in the national accounts include trade flows among 
the member countries of the euro area. Yet, cal-
culations of the ECB (2004: 42–43) on the basis 
of trade data that are only partly comparable to 
those in the national accounts suggest that the 
deliveries to countries outside the euro area also 
strongly increased. According to these estimates, 
extra-euro-area exports rose at an annualized rate 
of 8 percent in the third quarter of last year. Ap-
parently, the dampening effects of the euro ap-
preciation on external demand were overcom-
pensated by the strong economic dynamics in the 
rest of the world. While exports to the United 
States stagnated, the deliveries to Asia went up 
particularly strongly. Exports to the United King-
dom and to Eastern European countries were also 
markedly oriented upwards. 
In the meantime, domestic demand remained 
weak; the strong rise in the fourth quarter of last 
year was mainly attributable to an unusually large 
increase in stocks. Private households hardly 
expanded their consumption expenditures in the 
second half of 2003. The index of consumer con-
fidence compiled by the European Commission 
indicates that private households are pessimistic 
about their current and expected financial situ-
ation. Apparently, they have increased savings 
against this background. In contrast, the invest-
ment climate has brightened up perceptibly; in 
the second half of last year the decrease in cor-
porate investment has come to a standstill. This 
was mainly due to markedly improved sales and 
profits expectations in the wake of strong ex-
ternal demand and to the stabilization of capacity 
utilization in manufacturing. 
The increase in consumer prices has accel-
erated somewhat in the second half of last year. 
Since mid-2003, the Harmonized Index of Con-
sumer Prices (HICP) has risen at an annualized 
rate of slightly more than 2 percent in seasonally 
adjusted terms. With that inflation has proved to 
be quite persistent despite the continued eco-
nomic weakness. Lately, the increase in food 
prices was particularly strong whereas energy 
prices, that had marked the increase in consumer 
prices in the past years in the wake of the strong 
rise in oil prices, tended to be downwards oriented 
due to the euro appreciation. Last year on aver-
age, the HICP increased by 2.1 percent. In the 
meantime, the core inflation rate (HICP exclud-
ing energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) fell below 
the 2 percent threshold last year and most recent-
ly amounted to 1.6 percent. The decrease in core 
inflation is probably mainly due to firms’ dimin-
ished scope for raising prices against the back-
ground of continued economic weakness. 
2  Monetary Conditions Remain 
Favorable 
Key interest rates in the euro area have been un-
changed since June last year. The minimum bid 
rate on the main refinancing operations of the 
Eurosystem is still at 2.0 percent. The 3-month 
EURIBOR was also roughly at that level at the 
beginning of March 2004 (Figure 2). In the 
months before, it had been somewhat higher re-
flecting the markets’ expectations of a rate hike 
by the ECB in the near future. However, this has 
changed in the wake of the renewed appreciation 
of the euro so that money market rates declined 
once again. The stance of monetary policy con-
tinues to be expansionary. If nominal short-term 
rates are corrected with the core rate of inflation, 
the calculated real rate amounts to some 0.5 per-
cent and is well below the long-term average 
which has been estimated at 2.5 percent (Gern et  6 
Figure 2: 
Indicators of Monetary Policy in Euroland, 1980–2004 
 



























































  Short-Term Interest Rates  Long-Term Interest Rates 
Yield Spreadb  U.S. Dollar/Euro Exchange Ratec 
Money Stock M1a Money  Stock  M3a 
 
aPercentage change over previous year. — bLong-term interest rate minus short-term interest rate. — cBefore 1999: 
exchange rate U.S. dollar/ecu. 
Source: ECB (2004). 7 
Figure 3:  
Short-Term Interest Rate and Taylor Rate in Euroland, 1999–2003 
 











aThe Taylor rate is calculated for the HICP excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco. The calculations are based on the 
assumption of an inflation target of 1.75 percent and on the assumption of an equilibrium real interest rate of 2.5 percent. 
Potential output is estimated with a Hodrick–Prescott filter. 
Source: Eurostat (2004); ECB (2004); own calculations and estimates. 
al. 2003: 14). Also, the short-term rate is lower 
than the Taylor rate according to the commonly 
used formula (Figure 3). Even if the real equi-
librium rate was 1  percentage point lower than 
the long-term average, monetary policy would still 
have to be considered expansionary. In this sense, 
the central bank is accommodative allowing the 
output gap to close. 
Long-term interest rates have been more or 
less unchanged since fall 2003. Recently, the 10-
year bond rate stood at 4.3 percent which is 
about 50 basis points higher than in the spring 
of  last year when bond yields had reached the 
bottom. Also in real terms, long-term rates have 
hardly changed in the past six months and have 
remained well below their long-run average. 
While interest rates have been relatively constant 
since fall 2003, monetary conditions have deteri-
orated because of the strength of the euro ex-
change rate. In real effective terms, the European 
currency appreciated by an estimated 6 percent 
between September 2003 and February 2004, and 
the euro increased by a little more than 10 percent 
against the U.S. dollar. Monetary expansion has 
continued to slow down in recent months; the 
annual growth rate of M3 fell below 7 percent 
for the first time since 2½ years. 
3  Appreciation of the Euro: 
Should the ECB React? 
The ECB is urged to respond to the strength of 
the euro. One reasoning calls for interventions on 
exchange markets and the purchase of U.S. 
dollars in order to stop the appreciation or even 
turn the exchange rate around. In addition, the 
ECB should, as many observers argue, lower 
interest rates in order to reduce the negative 
effects of the appreciation on economic activity 
and to prevent inflation from falling below the 
target of the ECB.  
It has to be remembered, however, that the 
current level of the exchange rate is approxi-
mately equal to the average rate during most of 
the 1990s. Therefore, the euro is not particularly 
strong. In addition, many observers assume that a 8 
strong depreciation of the U.S. dollar is neces-
sary in order to reduce the current account deficit 
of the United States to a more sustainable level. 
This is one of the possibilities to achieve this 
target (Benner et al. 2004).3 
For good reasons, the ECB has made clear that 
it does not intend to respond to or even control 
the exchange rate. Experience shows that inter-
ventions are not successful in the attempt to stop 
a trend or to turn the trend around. As the level 
of an exchange rate cannot be affected by steril-
ized interventions anyway, the ECB would have 
to buy foreign exchange, i.e., U.S. dollars. But 
even if interventions are not sterilized, the effects 
on the exchange rate are highly uncertain. In 
particular, it is impossible to estimate the exact 
amount which would be necessary in order to 
achieve the desired effect on the rate. Sooner or 
later, the stance of monetary policy would have 
to be changed, i.e., interest rates in the euro area 
would have to decline and liquidity would in-
crease. Through this mechanism, the expansion-
ary course of monetary policy in the United 
States, which may be one of the reasons for the 
weakness of the U.S. dollar, would be trans-
mitted to the euro are. This would have adverse 
effects on Euroland’s economy because it would 
be more difficult for the ECB to achieve price 
level stability. Another reason why such inter-
ventions should not be tried is that the fall of the 
U.S. dollar may be due to the fact that the mar-
kets want a weaker U.S. dollar as a means to 
bring down the U.S. current account deficit to a 
more sustainable level. It is not known where 
markets see this level and therefore also to what 
level the exchange rate has to fall. As it may well 
be that the desired exchange rate is much lower, 
it would be impossible for the ECB to be suc-
cessful since it cannot stop the trend. All calls for 
interventions imply that the “true” or “correct” 
level of the U.S. dollar is known; however, no-
body can claim to have such superior knowledge. 
A different question is whether the ECB 
should use the instrument of sterilized interven-
tions in order to reduce large or abrupt changes 
____________________ 
3One alternative way to substantially bring down the deficit 
would be a sharp recession in the United States. However, 
this would also have adverse effects on the economy in the 
euro area. 
of the exchange rate. Such a policy would not 
affect the target of internal price stability as the 
amount of liquidity does not change. However, it 
is doubtful whether such a strategy would be 
successful in reality. For example, the interven-
tions of the ECB in fall 2000 had only a short-
lived effect; in several cases, the effect disap-
peared within a few hours, i.e., volatility could 
not be reduced at all.4 The strategy would be 
made even more difficult because at present the 
ECB would have to act alone because the other 
side, the United States, is not interested in af-
fecting the exchange rate or in an appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar. For example, contrary to the situ-
ation in earlier years, the U.S. administration 
does not talk about the desirability of a “strong 
dollar” anymore. Against this background it is un-
likely that there could be coordinated exchange 
market interventions by both the ECB and the Fed.  
Whether the ECB should lower interest rates 
as a response to the strength of the euro depends 
crucially on the effect that it will have on the 
targets mentioned in the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy. In this regard, it is not sufficient to only 
look at the expected effect on economic activity 
alone because the ECB does not intend to control 
the business cycle. The crucial question rather is 
whether the euro appreciation will drive the in-
flation rate in the euro area well below the target 
mentioned by the ECB. Here, the cycle may play 
an indirect role, of course, because if the ap-
preciation lowers the increase of real GDP, the 
possibility of firms to raise prices may be re-
duced. However, our analysis of the recent euro 
appreciation shows that the effect is not very 
strong (see Chapter 8). 
It appears also quite risky to assume that the 
strength of the euro has a strong dampening ef-
fect on the price level. Experience shows that in-
flation forecasts for Euroland have usually been 
overly optimistic. This is also true for the pro-
jections which the ECB publishes twice a year 
(Table 1).5 For  example,  the  fact  that  inflation 
____________________ 
4This negative judgment is based, for example, on an em-
pirical analysis of ECB interventions by Pierdzioch (2002). 
However, other studies show that sterilized interventions 
may be successful anyway (e.g., Fatum 2002). 
5Note that the ECB should not be criticized here for its 
“forecast errors”, also because the projections have been 
very much in line with the respective consensus forecasts. 9 
Table 1: 
Projections of the European Central Bank for Inflation 
in Eurolanda 
Date  2001 2002 2003 2004 
December 2000  2.3 1.9     
June 2001  2.5  1.8     
December 2001  2.7 1.6 1.5   
June 2002    2.3  1.9   
December 2002    2.2 1.8 1.6 
June 2003      2.0  1.3 
December 2003     2.1  1.8 
Actual  rate  2.5 2.3 2.1   
aYear-over-year increase of the HICP; center of the range given by the ECB. 
Source: ECB (various issues). 
was underestimated in 2002 and also in 2003 was 
surprising for mainly two reasons: First, eco-
nomic activity was much weaker than antici-
pated. The stronger than expected decline of 
the output gap should have dampened inflation. 
Second, the euro appreciated strongly in 2002 
and 2003. This was not considered in the pro-
jections which were based—as it is common in 
most model simulations—on unchanged ex-
change rates. The strength of the euro should 
have led to an overestimation, and not an under-
estimation of inflation in those two years.6 
There may be two conclusions one can draw 
from this observation. Either the effects of the 
weak economic activity and the appreciation 
were indeed as large as they had been estimated. 
In this case, the underlying rate of inflation in the 
euro area would have been considerably higher 
than 2 percent. This would actually call for a 
tightening of monetary policy because the reduc-
tion of key interest rates in the past two years 
would have gone too far. Or the effects are not as 
large as estimated in some models. In that case, 
the recent appreciation of the euro does not ne-
cessarily imply that rates should be cut as a con-
sequence. 
All in all, we think that it is appropriate that 
the ECB should wait and watch the development 
____________________ 
The main reason for using them here is that the ECB 
probably bases its monetary policy decisions on its own 
forecasts. 
6The euro appreciated by more than 20 percent in real ef-
fective terms. In those years, many model simulations were 
run for the possible case of a decline of the U.S. dollar. For 
example, the OECD (2001: 41) estimated that a real effec-
tive depreciation of the U.S. dollar by 10 percent would 
reduce Euroland’s inflation rate by about half a percentage 
point in the first year. 
in the near future. It is true that the central bank 
is in a difficult situation because it would not like 
to be made “responsible” for a possible slow-
down of the economy. But it has to be remem-
bered first that interest rates in the euro area have 
been unusually low for some time and that they 
imply a positive impulse for economic activity, 
and second that a premature cut of interest rates 
may be interpreted by markets that the ECB takes 
the target of price level stability less seriously. 
For the future course of monetary policy it is 
important how the ECB will assess the outlook 
for inflation in the euro area. In the economic 
analysis it will play a role that the recovery has 
started as it was anticipated by the ECB. This 
implies that there is no need to support economic 
activity further by loosening monetary policy. In 
addition, in the projection published in last De-
cember, the ECB expected inflation to fall slightly 
below 2 percent in the course of this year; this 
outlook will probably not change in the near 
future. In assessing the possibility of interest rate 
changes, one has to keep in mind that it is not 
sufficient to look at changes in the economic 
environment alone and then decide whether rates 
should be altered. It is also important to relate the 
existing level of interest rates to some norm. At 
present, interest rates are very low by several 
standards. In the medium term, they will have to 
be considerably higher if price level stability is to 
be achieved. Assuming a real equilibrium rate of 
2.5 percent, one would conclude that the neutral 
interest rate would be slightly above 4 percent. 
According to the Taylor rule this level would be 
appropriate if inflation is at its target (below and 
near 2 percent) and if the output gap is closed.7 
However, it will take some time until the ECB 
starts to tighten its policy. This will probably be 
the case only when the upswing has strengthened 
and when capacity utilization will have increased 
considerably. We expect that key interest rates 






7Should the real equilibrium rate have declined, for ex-
ample, because potential output growth has slowed, the 
neutral rate would accordingly be lower. 10 
4  Situation of Public Finances 
Improves Only Slightly 
The situation of public finances in the euro area 
further deteriorated last year. As in the preceding 
years, budget deficits in the member countries of 
the euro area exceeded the targets laid down in 
the Stability Programs. In 2003, the aggregated 
budget in the euro area exhibited a deficit of 2.7 
percent in relation to GDP (Table 2), following 
2.2 percent in the previous year. The renewed 
increase in the budget deficit was due to the on-
going weakness of economic activity. According 
to OECD (2003) estimates, economy-wide ca-
pacity utilization decreased by 1.4 percentage 
points last year. Assuming an elasticity of the 
budget balance with respect to the output gap of 
0.5 (OECD 1999: 147), the cyclical component 
of the change in the deficit amounted to 0.7 per-
cent in relation to GDP. The increase in the ac-
tual deficit was somewhat smaller last year be-
cause fiscal policy in the euro area as a whole 
was on a slightly restrictive course. According to 
OECD (2003) estimates, the structural budget 
deficit shrank in all member countries of the euro 
area except for France, Greece, and Austria. In 
Germany and in France, the budget deficit in 
relation to GDP once more exceeded the 3 per-
cent threshold laid down in the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The same is likely to occur 
in the forecast horizon. The aggregated budget 
deficit in the euro area will amount to 2.7 percent 
in relation to GDP this year. Against the back-
ground of a favorable cyclical situation and of 
consolidation efforts in some countries it is ex-
pected to fall to 2.4 percent next year. 
5  Stability and Growth Pact: 
Balancing the Budget Is the Key 
The actual performance of fiscal policy during 
the first five years of the European Monetary 
Union has shown that not all governments feel 
obliged to meet the targets of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). In France and in Germany, 
the budget deficit exceeded the 3 percent margin 
in the years 2002 and 2003, and the forecast is 
that this will also be the case this year and next. 
Following the decision of the ECOFIN Council 
to suspend the excessive deficit procedure against 
France and Germany,8 the debate about the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact has surged once again. 
Reforms of the SGP are being discussed, and 
there are already a few proposals. In general, 
they suggest some more “flexibility” in the inter-
pretation of the 3 percent threshold for budget 
deficits. However, this discussion is beside the 
point as far as the SGP is concerned. The core of 
the Pact as well as of the relevant documents for 
fiscal policy in the European Union is that gov-
ernments should achieve a balanced budget or a 
surplus.9 Meeting this target would imply that 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio does not reach the 3 per-
cent limit in a normal cyclical downturn. 
The main problem of fiscal policy in Europe is 
not that the ratios for the government budgets 
exceed 3 percent in some cases, but rather that 
the structural deficits have remained high. Even 
six years after the SGP had been ratified, the 
large economies have not come closer to balance 
their budgets; in France and in Germany the 
structural deficits are even higher than before the 
monetary union started (Table 3). This is a clear 
contradiction to the targets laid down in the an-
nual Stability Programs in recent years. In these 
Programs, the governments describe their plans 
for the budgets in the coming 3 or 4 years. For 
example, the French government announced in 
2001 to continuously bring the budget deficit 
down to zero in 2005; the German government 
had the same target for 2004. 
One can question the governments’ commit-
ment to a balanced budget when looking at the 
most recent projections. At the end of last year, 
the Stability Programs were updated for the fifth 
time (Table 4). The new targets show that the 
target of a balanced budget has obviously been 
given up completely in a few large countries. 
Budget deficits in France and in Germany will 
amount  to  1.5  percent  in  2007,  i.e.,  ten  years  
____________________ 
8For a discussion of the consequences of that decision see 
also Benner et al. (2003). 
9The common interpretation of this rule is that the member 
states should reach a balance or a surplus in the structural 
budget. 11 
Table 2: 
Indicators of Fiscal Positions in Euroland, 2002–2005 (in percent of nominal GDP) 
  Gross public sector debt  General government budget balance 
 2002  2003a 2004b 2005b 2002 2003a 2004b 2005b 
Germany 60.8  64.2  65.6  67.3 –3.5 –3.9 –3.8 –3.6 
France  59.0 61.5 62.0 62.5 –3.2 –4.1 –3.8 –3.3 
Italy  106.7 105.5 104.0 102.5 –2.3 –2.3 –2.8 –2.5 
Spain  53.8 52.0 50.5 49.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Netherlands 52.4  53.5  54.5 54.5 –1.6 –2.3 –2.5 –2.0 
Belgium 105.8  102.5  100.0  97.0 0.1 0.3  –0.7  –0.5 
Austria 67.3  68.5  68.5  68.0 –0.2 –1.2 –1.0 –0.8 
Finland 42.7  41.5  40.0  38.5 4.2 2.1 2.0 2.5 
Greece  104.7  103.0  101.0 99.0 –1.2 –1.7 –2.0 –2.0 
Portugal 58.1  60.0  60.5  60.5 –2.7 –2.8 –2.9 –2.5 
Ireland  32.4 31.0 30.5 30.0 –0.2 –1.5 –1.8 –1.5 
Luxembourg 5.7  5.7  5.7  5.5 2.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Euroland 69.0  70.1  70.1  70.1 –2.2 –2.7 –2.7 –2.4 
aPartly estimated. — bForecast. 
Source: Eurostat (2003); own calculations and forecasts. 
Table 3: 
Structural Budget Balances in Euroland, 1997–2003a 
Country  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Germany  –1.7 –1.4 –0.9 –1.4 –2.6 –2.6 –2.3 
France  –1.4 –1.6 –1.2 –1.6 –1.7 –3.0 –2.9 
Italy  –2.2 –2.7 –1.3 –2.1 –2.9 –2.1 –1.8 
Euroland  –1.6 –1.7 –1.0 –1.4 –1.9 –1.9 –1.7 
aIn percent of potential GDP. 
Source: OECD (2003). 
Table 4: 
Key Figures of the Updated Stability Programsa 
 GDP  growthb General  government 
budget balancec 
Gross public debtc Expendituresc Receiptsc 
 2000–2003  2004–2007  2003d 2007 2003d 2007 2003d 2007 2003d 2007 
Germany  1.0  2.1 –4.0 –1.5  64.0 64.5 49.0 44.5 45.0 43.0 
France  1.9  2.5 –4.0 –1.5  61.4 61.8 54.3 51.8 50.3 50.3 
Italy  1.4  2.3 –2.5  0.0 106.0 98.6 48.4 46.2 45.8 44.0 
Spain  2.9  3.0  0.5  0.3  51.8 43.8 39.6 39.7 40.0 40.0 
Netherlands  1.0  2.1 –2.3 –0.6  54.0 52.2 47.6 45.2 45.5 44.6 
Belgium  1.5  2.3  0.0  0.3 102.3 87.0 49.6 47.9 49.7 48.2 
Austria  1.6  2.3 –1.3 –0.4  66.4 59.9 51.9 48.4 50.6 48.0 
Finland  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.2  45.1 44.6 48.7 48.8 51.0 51.0 
Greecee  4.2  4.0 –1.4  0.0 101.7 90.5 45.2 43.5 43.7 43.5 
Portugal  1.1  2.3 –2.9 –1.1  59.5 57.0 47.0 43.5 44.1 42.5 
Irelande  6.1  3.8 –0.4 –1.1  33.1 33.3 34.6 33.6 34.1 32.5 
Luxembourge  3.2  2.9 –0.6 –1.5  4.9  4.4 47.7 46.4 47.1 44.9 
Eurolandf  1.7  2.4 –2.7 –0.8  70.1 67.1 48.8 46.0 46.1 44.9 
aSome Stability Programs include alternative scenarios concerning GDP growth. This table reflects the basic scenario. — bAverage annual 
growth rate. Partly estimated. — cIn percent of GDP. — dFigures for 2003 are taken from the Stability Programs. — eProjection until 2006 
only. — fAverage for the countries above. Country weights based on GDP in current prices of 2002. 
Source: Stability Programs; own calculations and estimates. 12 
after the Stability and Growth Pact has taken 
effect. Furthermore, the Pact actually says that 
budget should at least be balanced over the cycle. 
The large economies of the euro area are far 
away from budget surpluses, which have been 
common in many other countries. In addition, 
just those countries which have missed the defi-
cit targets several time, have “succeeded” in 
abolishing the sanction mechanism of the Pact in 
the ECOFIN Council in November 2003. 
In the discussion on the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the focus should not so much be on more 
“flexibility” in the interpretation of the ceilings 
for budget deficits, but rather that budgets should 
be balanced in the medium term. A reform of the 
SGP which would abandon this principle of fis-
cal policy would undermine one of the fundamen-
tal conditions for economic stability in Europe. 
All governments have stressed over and over 
again the necessity of such a sound fiscal policy, 
for example, in the “Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines”. This was also based on the notion 
that the ECB should be supported when securing 
the target of price level stability for the euro area. 
The more the process of budget consolidation is 
postponed, the higher may be the pressure on the 
central bank to lower interest rates or to allow a 
higher rate of inflation in order to reduce the real 
value of government debt. In addition, the proba-
bility increases that drastic measures must be 
taken by fiscal policy in order to finance the rising 
payments of social security. If government debt 
increases as it does currently, drastic increases of 
taxes and social contributions or massive cuts in 
the payments would be unavoidable. In order to 
prevent exactly such a situation, the governments 
had decided before the beginning of the mone-
tary union to balance the budgets as soon as 
possible. Therefore, the countries are in the end 
wasting precious time and putting themselves in 
a bad situation if deficits remain high. Since the 
citizens are well aware of all these problems, 
they expect a higher burden and a lower dispos-
able income in the future. So their decisions to 
consume and to invest are negatively affected by 
the fact that governments fail to bring down ex-
penditures to a more sustainable level. One con-
sequence of the unsound fiscal policy is that 
the growth rate of potential output will decline. 
Therefore, the policy of the governments is in 
sharp contrast to the target of the European Union 
to become the most dynamic economic region in 
the world by the end of this decade. 
6  Little Change in Wage Growth 
The slight deceleration of wage growth that can 
be observed since early 2002 has continued in 
the course of last year. Wage developments were 
characterized by a significant negative wage 
drift: Growth of negotiated wages moderated only 
very slightly, while increases in gross monthly 
earnings decelerated stronger, by 0.5 percentage 
points, to 2.6 percent in the third quarter 2003. 
Meanwhile, growth in compensation per em-
ployee remained largely unchanged, at 2.5 per-
cent, as social contributions were raised in a 
number of countries.  
In the current year, wage costs are set to rise at 
a slightly reduced pace (Table 5). Wage contracts 
already finalized and the prospective develop-
ment of social security contributions suggest that 
compensation per employee will slow down 
somewhat, particularly in the large countries. 
Deceleration of wage growth will even be very 
pronounced in the Netherlands as a result of the 
especially significant deterioration in the Dutch 
labor market (Table 6). For next year, we expect 
wages in Euroland to pick up gradually given the 
improved economic outlook. Already pointing 
into that direction is the result of the wage bar-
gaining in the German metal industries, which 
traditionally has a large impact on negotiations in 
other sectors and, as a result of this and due to 
the size of the German economy, is also of sig-
nificance for wage developments in the euro area 
as a whole. 
The projected wage development can be ex-
pected to have some positive effect on employ-
ment, as the result is a significant wage restraint. 
In the current year, this is true for a yardstick of 
wage moderation that relates the sum of the 
growth rates of output and the GDP deflator and 
the growth rate of compensation per employee10  
____________________ 
10For an exposition of this concept of wage moderation and 
an application to wage developments in Germany see 
Lehment and Oskamp (2004). 13 
Table 5: 
Compensation of Employees, Productivity and Unit Labor Costs in Euroland, 2001–2005 (change over previous 
year in percent) 
 2001  2002  2003a 2004a 2005a 
Compensation of 
employees  per  worker  2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.6 
Productivityb  0.2 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.3 
Unit  labor  costs  2.5 2.1 2.4 1.2 1.3 
aForecast. — bReal GDP per worker. 
Source: ECB (2004); own calculations and forecasts. 
Table 6: 
Wage Increasesa in Euroland, 2001–2005 (change over previous year in percent) 
 2001  2002  2003b 2004c 2005c 
Germany  1.8 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.5 
France  2.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.7 
Italy  3.0 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.8 
Spain  3.8 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0 
Netherlands  5.5 4.9 3.8 1.5 1.2 
Portugal  5.5 5.3 2.5 2.5 2.7 
Austria  1.4 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Belgium  3.6 4.3 2.2 2.8 3.0 
Greece  5.3 8.4 6.5 7.5 5.5 
Finland  4.7 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.2 
Ireland  9.0 5.2 5.0 4.5 5.0 
Luxembourg  3.7 3.1 2.5 2.5 3.0 
aCompensation of employees per worker. — bEstimates. — cForecast. 
Source: European Commission (2003a); own forecasts. 
as well as in a cyclically adjusted perspective, 
which compares the wage growth with the sum 
of the trend rate of productivity growth and the 
rate of increase in the GDP deflator (Carstensen 
et al. 2003: 21). In 2005, wage increases will 
remain modest against both of these measures. 
The wage contracts can also be described as 
being consistent with price level stability. The 
increase in unit labor cost is expected to amount 
to 1–1.5 percent. Thus, the development of labor 
costs supports achieving the inflation target of 
the ECB. This was not always the case in recent 
years. During the cyclical downturn, the rise in 
unit labor cost remained stubbornly above 2 per-
cent as wages were slow to react to the recession 
and the better part of the cyclically induced re-
duction of productivity growth was reflected in 
rising unit labor costs.11 As a result, during the 
____________________ 
11Note that the development in the United States was 
different. In the United States, wage growth decelerated 
recent period of cyclical weakness the contribu-
tion of wages to reduce production costs in Euro-
land was relatively small. This might be one ex-
planation for the observed disappointingly slow 
trajectory of Euroland inflation into the territory 
which is consistent with price level stability in 
the definition of the ECB.  
When evaluating wage developments, it has to 
be considered that the increase of labor produc-
tivity in Euroland has been on a declining trend 
during the 1990s (Gern et al. 2000). In the past 
three years labor productivity even nearly stag-
nated. While this absence of productivity growth 
can to a large extent be explained by cyclical fac-
tors, it suggests that the negative long-term trend 
____________________ 
rapidly during the economic downturn. The rate of increase 
in compensation per employee slowed down to around 2 
percent in 2002 and 2003 from a 5.4 percent rate of growth 
in 2000 at the height of the boom. This contributed to a 
benign development of nominal unit labor costs, which 
temporarily declined significantly. 14 
is still intact. Consequently, for the forecast hori-
zon we also project only moderate rises in output 
per employee. The slow productivity growth in 
our view indicates that potential output growth in 
Euroland has declined. It is, however, argued that 
reforms on the labor market have raised the 
labor intensity of growth. With measures such as 
easing of the rules for temporary work contracts 
(particularly significant in Spain), promotion of 
part-time jobs (Netherlands) or reduction of labor 
costs in low wage jobs (France, Germany), in-
centives for job creation have been improved and 
increasingly workers with low productivity have 
been integrated in the labor market.12 Weak pro-
ductivity growth, according to this argument, 
therefore should be regarded as a (positive) sign 
of increased flexibility of the European econ-
omies rather than as a (negative) indicator of 
rigidities that call for further economic reforms 
(Bartsch 2004). While labor market reforms are 
found to have had a negative impact on labor 
productivity in the euro area (European Commis-
sion 2003b),13 only 25 percent of the deceler-
ation in labor productivity can be explained by 
this factor. The reduced contribution of invest-
ment (capital deepening) and a slowdown in the 
growth rate of total labor productivity have been 
more important. 
7  Outlook: Increase in Produc-
tion Remains Moderate 
The leading indicators suggest that economic ac-
tivity in the euro area will accelerate in the first 
half of 2004. The sentiment indicators compiled 
by the European Commission have been percep-
tibly oriented upwards for the past months. Con-
fidence in the industrial sector and in the service 
sector has markedly increased. In particular, ex-
____________________ 
12Measures that resulted in shifting jobs from the informal 
to the formal sector seem to have been a further significant 
factor, particularly in Italy. 
13This result points at the conflict inherent in the two goals 
in the Lisbon agenda, which calls to raise the employment 
share in the EU from 62 percent in 2002 to 70 percent in 
2010 while, at the same time, bringing labor productivity to 
U.S. levels, from currently 92 percent (Gros 2004). 
port expectations in the manufacturing sector 
have strongly improved despite the sharp appre-
ciation of the euro over the past twelve months. 
Against the U.S. dollar the euro has appreciated 
by around 19 percent over this period, in real ef-
fective terms it has appreciated by roughly 9 per-
cent. The improvement in export expectations 
indicates that the corporate sector expects a very 
dynamic world economy. Consumer confidence 
has also brightened up somewhat over the past 
months. Finally, the purchasing managers’ index 
and the growth indicator also point to a continu-
ation of the recovery, even though both indi-
cators have fallen somewhat lately. 
Real GDP is expected to increase by 1.7 per-
cent this year on average; in the course of the 
year it will probably expand slightly faster than 
potential output. Exports will continue to rise, 
even though the high speed of economic activity 
in the rest of the world will not fully manifest 
itself in external demand because of the dampen-
ing effects of the euro appreciation. Domestic 
demand is expected to pick up in the course of 
this year (Table 7). Stimulated by low interest 
rates, corporate investment will gain momentum. 
Private households will expand their consump-
tion expenditures at a slightly faster pace in view 
of brightened employment prospects. The situa-
tion on the labor market will gradually improve 
from spring on. The unemployment rate will 
amount to 8.7 percent this year on average, 
following 8.8 percent last year (Table 8). 
In the course of next year the economic expan-
sion will slow down slightly (Figure 4). Econ-
omy-wide production is expected to increase 
roughly in line with potential output. The some-
what slower pace of economic activity is due to 
the world economy, which will lose momentum 
next year (Benner et al. 2004). Against this back-
ground corporate investment is likely to decel-
erate. The situation on the labor market will 
further improve, supporting private consumption. 
All in all, real GDP is expected to increase by 2.0 
percent next year on average (Figure 5). 
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Table 7: 
Quarterly Data on the Economic Development in Euroland, 2003–2005 
 2003  2004  2005 
 I  II  III  IV  Ia IIa IIIa IVa I a IIa IIIa IVa 
Gross domestic productb  –0.1  –0.4 1.6 1.2  2.2 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Domestic demandb 1.5  0.5  –0.9  4.1  1.6  2.6  2.3 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 
Private consumptionb  1.7  0.0 0.8 0.3  2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 
Public consumptionb  2.0  2.2 2.5 2.4  0.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 
Fixed investmentb –3.6  –1.5  –0.7  2.6  3.3  3.6  3.8 4.0 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.7 
Change in stocksc 0.9  0.3  –1.7  2.7  –0.4  0.2  –0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Net exportsc –1.5  –0.8  2.5  –2.6  0.6  –0.6  –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1  0.0  0.0 
Exportsb,d  –6.0  –3.6 9.7 0.9  4.8 2.7 3.0 4.4 4.5 4.0 4.6 4.3 
Importsb,d  –2.4  –1.5 3.1 8.7  3.4 4.6 3.6 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.9 4.4 
Unemployment ratee  8.7  8.8 8.8 8.8  8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2 
Consumer prices (HICP)f  2.3  1.9 2.0 2.0  1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 
Money stock M3b  8.1  9.2 6.5 6.1  4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
3-month money market rate  2.9  2.4  2.1 2.1  2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Long term interest rate  4.2  4.0 4.2 4.4  4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 
U.S. dollar/euro exchange rateg 1.07 1.14 1.12 1.19  1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Real effective exchange rateh  99.1  102.9 101.9 104.2  107.0 107.0 107.0 107.0 107.0 107.0 107.0 107.0 
aForecast. — bAnnualized quarterly rate of change in percent. — cContribution to change in GDP, in percentage points. — 
dIncluding intra-Euroland trade. — eIn percent of the labor force, according to the ILO concept. —
 fChange over previous 
year in percent. — gU.S.-dollar/euro. — hBroad group. Based on the consumer price index. Index 1999 I = 100. 
Source: Eurostat (2004); ECB (2004); OECD (2003); own calculations and forecasts. 
Table 8: 
Real GDP, Consumer Prices and Unemployment Rate in Euroland, 2002–2005 
GDPb Consumer  pricesb,c Unemployment  rated    Weights in  
percenta  2002 2003e 2004f 2005f 2002 2003 2004f 2005f 2002 2003e 2004f 2005f 
Germany 29.8  0.2  –0.1  1.6  1.2  1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 8.6 9.3 9.1 9.0 
France  21.5  1.2 0.2 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.6 1.7 8.8 9.4 9.4 9.1 
Italy  17.8  0.4 0.4 1.0 1.6 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.2 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 
Spain  9.8  2.0 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.5 3.0  11.3  11.3  11.0  10.2 
Netherlands 6.3  0.2  –0.8  0.8  1.7  3.9 2.2 1.2 1.3 2.7 3.8 4.4 4.4 
Belgium  3.7  0.7 1.1 2.2 2.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.8 7.3 8.1 8.3 8.0 
Austria  3.1  1.3 0.8 2.0 2.7 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.8 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.4 
Finland  2.0  2.3 1.9 2.5 3.5 2.0 1.3 1.5 2.0 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.5 
Greece  2.0  3.8 4.7 5.2 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.7 4.0 9.9 9.2 8.5 8.1 
Portugal 1.8  0.4  –1.1  0.7  1.7  3.7 3.3 2.0 2.4 5.1 6.4 7.0 6.9 
Ireland  1.8  6.9 1.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 4.0 2.1 2.8 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.4 
Luxembourg  0.3  1.3 1.2 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.7 3.8 3.5 
Euroland  100.0  0.9 0.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.9 8.4g 8.8g 8.7g 8.4g 
aBased on GDP in current prices of 2002. — bPercentage change over previous year. — cHarmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP). — dStandardized unemployment rates according to the ILO concept. — ePartly estimated. — fForecast. — gBased on the 
number of employees in 2002. 
Source: ECB (2004); OECD (2003); own calculations and forecasts. 16 
Figure 4:  

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annualized quarterly rate 
(right scale) 
 
aSeasonally adjusted. — bAnnualized quarterly rate of change in percent. — cPercentage change over previous year. — 
dForecast starting in 2004 I. 
Source: Eurostat (2004); own forecast. 
Figure 5: 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aAt constant prices. — bPercentage change over previous year. — cChange of net exports over previous year in percent of 
GDP in the same quarter of previous year. — dForecast starting in 2004 I. 
Source: Eurostat (2004); own forecast. 17 
The increase in consumer prices is likely to re-
main moderate over the forecast horizon. While 
economy-wide capacity utilization will rise some-
what in the course of the recovery, it will still not 
have reached its normal level at the end of the 
forecast horizon. Against this background firms’ 
scope for raising prices will remain small. Damp-
ening effects on consumer prices also stem from 
the decelerated increase in unit labor costs and 
from the appreciation of the euro. If, moreover, 
there are no strong fluctuations in the particularly 
volatile prices for energy and food, the inflation 
rate will be roughly equal to the target rate of the 
European Central Bank. We expect the Har-
monized Index of Consumer Prices to increase 
by 1.8 percent this year on average and by 1.9 
percent in 2005. 
8  Real Effects of the Euro’s 
Appreciation 
Since early 2002, the euro has appreciated in real 
effective terms by some 20 percent. Vis-à-vis 
the  U.S. dollar, the appreciation has been even 
sharper. Against this background, concern has 
been raised that the developments on the foreign 
exchange markets may considerably dampen the 
upswing in the euro area. Therefore, we analyzed 
how strong the retarding effects of an appreci-
ation of the euro on economic activity in the euro 
area can be expected.  
Recent studies by international organizations 
with large macroeconometric models are of limited 
usefulness with regard to this question since they 
focus on the effects of a depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar. Typically, an effective devaluation of the 
dollar is assumed. The OECD (2003) found in an 
analysis based on its econometric world model 
that a 10 percent real effective depreciation of 
the U.S. dollar would slow down economic 
growth in the euro area by 0.2 percentage points 
in the first year.14 Simulations of the six German 
____________________ 
14The results in OECD (2003) refer to the change in the 
output gap against the baseline solution. With potential out-
put growth unaffected by exchange rate changes, the docu-
research institutes (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 2002) 
with the macroeconometric multi-country model 
of Oxford Economic Forecasting found that a 10 
percent real appreciation of the euro against the 
dollar would dampen GDP growth in the euro 
area by 0.1 percentage points, both in the first 
and in the second year. However, the simulations 
implied strong endogenous reactions from mone-
tary policy. Euro-area interest rates would de-
cline by 0.9 percentage points in the first year 
and by 0.3 percentage points in the second. 
Without these reactions, the output effect would 
have been stronger.  
8.1 The  Model 
In the present paper, the appreciation of the euro 
will be analyzed using a small macroeconometric 
model of aggregate demand in the euro area.15 
The model can be interpreted as the “IS equa-
tion” of a larger macroeconomic model for the 
euro area. It is specified with the demand side of 
the national accounts statistics in mind, with in-
dividual behavioral equations for domestic de-
mand, exports and imports, which are analyzed as 
a system of simultaneous dynamic equations.16 A 
special feature of the model is that the euro area 
is divided into Germany and the rest of the euro 
area. In this way, it is possible to generate 
consistent results for Germany and the euro area. 
Each region is modeled separately by four sto-
chastic equations (exports, imports, domestic de-
mand and industrial production). The regional 
results are aggregated via identities to give the 
results for the euro area as a whole. Indicators for 
the rest of the euro area with respect to price 
competitiveness and industrial production of 
their trading partners were constructed on the 
basis of foreign trade weights for the countries of 
the rest of the euro area (Buldorini et al. 2002).  
The model accounts not only for the primary 
effects of an appreciation of the euro, but also for 
a number of important side- and feedback ef-
____________________ 
mented change in the output gap by 0.2 percentage points 
implies a change in real GDP of the same magnitude.  
15See Meier (2004) for a detailed exposition of the model. 
16Rae and Turner (2001) present a similar specification. 18 
fects. In particular, the model considers that ex-
port and import data from the national accounts 
for the euro area comprise the trade among its 
member states. Exports of the rest of the euro 
area will thus be influenced by GDP in the euro 
area. A dampening effect on exports by an ap-
preciation of the euro will, therefore, be followed 
by another dampening effect because of lower 
GDP growth. The model also accounts for the 
fact that imports are influenced by exports. That 
is, that the effect on GDP of a decline in exports 
due to appreciation will be lowered by the fall in 
imports that it causes. In addition, imports are 
affected by domestic demand.  
The model, finally, accounts for terms of trade 
effects on domestic demand. A real appreciation 
of the euro can be interpreted as a positive 
supply shock for the euro area, comparable to an 
increase in productivity growth or to a fall in oil 
prices: either less must be exported to finance a 
given amount of imports or more can be im-
ported for a given amount of exports (Kohli 
2004).17 To account for this terms of trade effect, 
the indicator of price competitiveness is intro-
duced as a second argument in the stochastic 
equation for domestic demand.18  
The model does not account for endogenous 
reactions of monetary policy. All simulated ef-
fects of an appreciation apply for given interest 
rates. Moreover, the model does not allow for 
feedback effects from inflation and wages. Since 
the main channel via which these entities could 
affect aggregate demand would be monetary 
policy, which we assumed to remain exogenous, 
____________________ 
17In contrast to a productivity shock, however, the positive 
real income effect of an appreciation or of an oil price fall is 
not accounted for by real GDP. In fact, real GDP falls as a 
result of a fall in import prices since the latter enters the 
GDP deflator with a negative sign. Kohli (2004) shows that 
changes in the terms of trade account for a large share of the 
changes in real income of a number of industrialized coun-
tries. Fox et al. (2002) analyze the terms of trade effect for a 
single country in a time series study.  
18The coefficient of the indicator of price competitiveness 
was highly significantly positive, both in the equation for 
Germany and in the equation for the rest of the euro area. 
Accounting for this variable also increased the stability of 
the estimation results and the fit of the equation. The long 
run elasticity of domestic demand with respect to the in-
dicator of price competitiveness was estimated to be 0.2 for 
Germany and 0.13 for the rest of the euro area (Meier 
2004).  
we did not care to model the wage-price pro-
cess.19 
8.2  Results of the Simulations 
The impact of a real effective revaluation of the 
euro by 10 percent is summarized in Figure 6. It 
is assumed that the exchange rate reaches its new 
level immediately and remains there over the 
period analyzed. In the quarter of the appreci-
ation, exports fall against the baseline solution, 
both in Germany and in the rest of the euro area. 
This fall continues over the next quarters, albeit 
with declining speed. In the first year, annual 
average export growth in Germany falls by 3.5 
percentage points behind the baseline solution 
(Table 9), for the rest of the euro-area, the 
respective figure is 2.3 percentage points and ex-
ports of the euro area as a whole will be damp-
ened by 2.6 percentage points. In the second 
year, the effect is smaller, amounting to –0.8 per-
centage points for the euro area as a whole. Even 
for the third year, a significant negative effect 
on euro-area  exports  is documented (–0.5 per-
centage points). In the long run, German exports 
fall by 5 percent against the baseline solution. 
This result conforms with our previous studies 
(e.g., Benner et al. 2002) if one takes into ac-
count that changes in the real effective exchange 
rate of the euro translate into the German in-
dicator of price competitiveness that enters our 
export equation with a factor of 0.5.20  
Imports react in a similar way, albeit some-
what less pronounced than exports. The esti-
mated multiplier is, however, subject to consider-
ably higher estimation uncertainty. The annual 
average of import growth falls behind the base-
line solution by 2.8 percentage points in the first 
year in Germany and  by 1.2 percentage points in  
____________________ 
19This implies that there is no feedback effect on price 
competitiveness. Given the stickiness of prices, the impact 
of this omission should be small in the adjustment period of 
3 years that we analyze. 
20In the present model, exports are additionally dampened 
by lower economic activity in the rest of the euro area. 
However, this effect is counteracted by the fact that the long 
run elasticity of German exports with respect to the in-
dicator of price competitiveness is estimated somewhat 
lower here (0.9) than in Benner et al. (2002) (1.1).  19 
Figure 6: 
Effects of a 10 Percent Real Effective Appreciation of the Euro on Main Aggregates in Germany and in the Rest 
of the Euro Areaa 
  Germany  Euro Area Excluding Germany  Euro Area 














































































































aDeviation from the baseline solution in percent. The change in the exchange rate occurs in period 1. Broken lines indicate 
the 95 percent confidence interval of the respective multiplies. Confidence intervals are estimated via stochastic simulation 
(non-parametric bootstrapping with 1,000 replications). 20 
Table 9: 
Effects of a 10 Percent Real Effective Appreciation of the Euro on Main Aggregates in Germany and in the Euro 
Areaa 
 Exports  Imports  Domestic  demand  GDP 
  Germany 
1
st  year   –3.5  (–4.2;  –2.8)   –2.8  (–3.6;  –2.0)   –0.3  (–0.6;  –0.1)   –0.8  (–1.0;  –0.5) 
2
nd  year   –1.5  (–1.7;  –1.3)   –0.3  (0.7;  0.1)   0.4  (0.3;  0.6)   –0.0  (–0.1;  0.0) 
3
rd  year    –0.7 (–0.9; –0.5)    0.2 (–0.1;  0.5)   0.4  (0.3;  0.5)   0.1  (0.0;  0.0) 
  Euro area excluding Germany 
1
st  year   –2.3  (–3.3;  –1.3)   –1.2  (–2.6;  0.2)   0.1  (–0.5;  0.8)   –0.4  (–0.8;  0.1) 
2
nd year    –0.6 (–1.0; –0.2)    0.0 (–0.7;  0.7)   0.1  (–0.2;  0.6)   –0.1  (–0.3;  0.2) 
3
rd year    –0.3 (–0.7;  0.0)    0.2 (–0.5;  0.7)   0.1  (–0.2;  0.5)   –0.0  (–0.2;  0.2) 
  Euro area 
1
st  year   –2.6  (–3.5;  –1.8)   –1.6  (–2.8;  –0.5)   0.0  (–0.5;  0.5)   –0.5  (–0.8;  –0.1) 
2
nd  year   –0.8  (–1.2;  –0.5)   –0.1  (–0.7;  0.5)   0.2  (0.0;  0.5)   –0.1  (–0.3;  0.2) 
3
rd year    –0.5 (–0.8; –0.2)    0.1 (–0.4;  0.6)   –0.2  (0.0;  0.5)   0.0  (–0.2;  0.2) 
aEffect on the rates of change against the average of the previous year. Figures in parentheses give upper and lower bounds 
of the 95 percent confidence intervals. The latter are estimated via stochastic simulation (non-parametric bootstrapping with 
1,000 replications). 
Table 10: 
Effects of a 10 Percent Real Appreciation of the Euro Against the U.S. Dollar on Main Aggregates in the Euro 
Areaa 
 Exports  Imports  Domestic  demand  GDP 
1
st  year   –0.9  (–1.3;  –0.5)   –0.6  (–1.0;  0.0)   0.0  (–0.2;  0.2)   –0.2  (–0.3;  –0.0) 
2
nd  year   –0.3  (–0.4;  –0.2)   –0.0  (–0.3;  0.1)   0.1  (0.0;  0.2)   0.0  (–0.1;  0.0) 
aEffect on the rates of change against the average of the previous year. Figures in parentheses give upper and lower bounds 
of the 95 percent confidence intervals. The latter are estimated via stochastic simulation (non-parametric bootstrapping with 
1,000 replications). 
 
the rest of the euro area. The fall in imports, thus, 
compensates much of the fall in exports, al-
though not all of it.  
As regards domestic demand, it is interesting 
to note that in Germany the stimulating effect of 
improved terms of trade is at first overcompen-
sated by lower GDP growth. Still, after some six 
quarters, the terms of trade effect starts to domi-
nate, but the estimate is too imprecise to reject 
the hypothesis that domestic demand remains un-
affected by exchange rate changes in the long 
run. For the rest of the euro area, there is an im-
mediate positive impact, but this is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. Real GDP is affected 
by the appreciation mainly in the first year. In 
Germany, it falls behind the baseline solution by 
0.8 percentage points. In the rest of the euro area 
the dampening effects are smaller due to the 
small impact effect on exports; real GDP grows 
0.4 percentage points less than in the baseline 
solution. The euro area as a whole loses 0.5 per-
centage points. In the following years, the effects 
are not significantly different from zero.  
Note that the dynamic multipliers estimated 
here are similar to those of the OECD (2003). To 
make the present study approximately compa-
rable to that of the OECD which focuses on a 
10 percent real effective U.S. dollar depreciation, 
Table 10 shows the effects of a real appreciation 
of the euro only against the U.S. dollar in our 
model. Accordingly, real GDP in the euro area 
falls behind the baseline solution by 0.2 per-
centage points in the first year, with no further 
significant effects in the following years. The 
OECD study finds that the output gap in the euro 
area is by 0.2 percentage points smaller than in 
the baseline solution in both the first and the 
second year and by 0.3 percentage points in the 21 
third year. The small further opening of the out-
put gap in the third year apart, these results are in 
line with those of the present study. Moreover, 
they are close to what we assumed in our pre-
vious forecasts for Germany and the euro area.  
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